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Monte Ransome Johnson
Human life is pure luck.
(Solon apud Herodotus 1.32.4)
He <Thales or Socrates> said that he owed thanks to luck for three
things: ‘ﬁrst, that I was born a human and not a beast; second, a man
and not a woman; third a Greek and not a Barbarian’.
(Diogenes Laertius 1.33)
Aristotle was the ﬁrst philosopher to offer a systematic account of luck
(hê tuchê) and to include it as a signiﬁcant topic in both physics and ethics.
In the Physics he complains that his predecessors, although they treat luck as a
cause, have not explained its relation to art, nature, and necessity: ‘they all
speak of some things happening by luck and others not, and so they should
have at least taken some note of these things’ (196a15–17). Thus Aristotle
repeatedly calls for an investigation of luck and the wider phenomena of
spontaneity (to automaton). This he delivers not only in Physics 2.4–6,
but also in several other stretches of natural philosophy (APo. 1.8–11; Cael.
2.6;GA 3.11;Metaph. 7.7–9). In his ethics, Aristotle blazes a parallel dialectical
trail. Although the predecessors mentioned luck in their ethical discussions
(Aristotle himself refers to Socrates1 in Plato’s Euthydemus), no one before
Aristotle deﬁned luck or explained how it relates to the causes of happiness.
Aristotle, however, explicitly framed the problem of moral luck in several
sustained discussions (EN 1.9–11; EE 7.14; MM 2.8).
In physics, Aristotle walks a middle course between one extreme of
making luck and spontaneity the causes of everything in the universe,
and another extreme of eliminating these causes. Thus although Aristotle
refuses to recognise any spontaneous occurrences in the heavens, he
theorised many spontaneous phenomena in the meteorological and
1 EE 7.14.1247b15. See Plato Euthydemus 279c. Aristotle complains that Socrates focused only on ‘what
virtue is’ and not ‘how or why it comes about’ (i.e. its causes) at EE 1.5.1216b10.
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terrestrial zones, for example, accepting that some plants and animals are
generated spontaneously. But he insists that most and the most important
living things require reproduction of natural forms and he insists that
neither spontaneity nor luck could possibly account for those things.
In ethics, Aristotle also plots a middle course between one extreme of
considering human success nothing more than good luck (as Solon does
according toHerodotus), and another extreme of eliminating luck entirely,
as Democritus attempted to do.2 For Aristotle, success is (always or for the
most part) due to natural drives and intelligence, discipline and habitua-
tion, or the cultivation of intellect, art, and science. Nevertheless, there
really is good and bad luck: for example, some people enjoy goods without
being intelligent, while others who are intelligent suffer from unfortunate
circumstances not up to them.
Recognising this as a deep problem about agency, responsibility, and
fairness (and so, in a word, morality), Aristotle tried to minimise the
impact of luck but is ultimately forced to conclude that some kinds of
moral luck are not eliminable, even if they are reducible to causal factors
like nature and intelligence. Immediately following Aristotle, beginning
with Theophrastus’ widely criticised work On Happiness, moral luck
became a central issue of Hellenistic ethics. Stoic philosophers especially
tried to eliminate luck from ethics, arguing against Aristotle and the
Peripatetics that luck cannot affect human morality.3 The related dispute
over the value of ‘external goods’ is in the historical background of Kant’s
inﬂuential attempt to resolve these issues.4 His perceived failure on this
score is the starting point of two inﬂuential essays both entitled ‘Moral
Luck’ (Williams 1976 and Nagel 1979), rightly regarded as modern classics.
These essays revived a problem that remains as Aristotle found it, a central
problem for moral theory.
What I aim to contribute to this discussion is a clariﬁcation of how
Aristotle’s formulation of the problem of moral luck relates to his natural
philosophy. My ﬁrst tasks will be to review well-known passages from the
Ethics and Physics without being able here to enter into the usual inter-
pretive controversies about them. Hence I do not claim originality in my
presentation of the account of luck in Physics 2, or formulation of the
2 For further discussion of the views of Democritus on these issues see Johnson 2014.
3 See the passages collected as fragments 487–501 in Fortenbaugh et al. 1992: 317–29.
4 For useful discussions of the interplay of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on the topic of the value of
external goods see Engstrom 1996: 122–24; Annas 1996: 240–42; and Sherman 1997: 9–20. Whiting
1996, 182–85 explicitly raises the issue of moral luck and reads EE 7.14 as support for her ‘Kantian
reading’ of Aristotle’s EE 8.3 (= 7.15).
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problem of moral luck in EN 1/10 and EE 1/7. In the main I focus on EE
7.14 (= 8.2). I argue that Aristotle’s position there (rejecting the elimination
of luck, but reducing luck so far as possible to incidental natural and
intelligent causes) is not only consistent with his treatment of luck in
Physics 2,5 but is to be expected, given that the dialectical path of EE 7.14
runs parallel to that of Physics 2.4–6. Although Aristotle resolves some
issues that he raises, he cannot avoid the problem of constitutive moral luck
that, as Nagel puts it, pertains to ‘the kind of person you are, where this is
not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations,
capacities, and temperament’ (28). The problem for Aristotle follows not
only from his ethical positions, but also directly from his more general
physical and political principles and assumptions. Furthermore, the pro-
blem touches the very essence of Aristotle’s moral theory.6
Aristotle raises the problem of moral luck right at the beginning of the
Eudemian Ethics:
First we must investigate in what the good life consists and how it is
acquired, and whether it is by nature (phusei) that all those men to whom
the term is applied come to be happy as we become tall people and short
people and differently coloured people, or due to learning so that happiness
will be a kind of knowledge, or due to some kind of training. For many
things happen neither in accordance with nature nor learning, but by
habituation (ethistheisin) for humans; poor things if they are habituated
poorly, good if well. Or do men become happy in none of these ways, but
either, like those humans the nymphs and deities possess, by oversight of a
spirit (epipnoia daimoniou tinos), like those who are inspired? Or is it due to
luck (dia tuchên), since many people say happiness and good luck to be the
same thing? What is clear is that it is in all or some of these ways that people
become happy. (EE 1.1.1214a14–27).7
The possibility that the good life might come about either by nature or by
luck is later reiterated as a special problem:
If a noble life is something that comes to be due to luck (dia tuchên) or due
to nature (dia phusin), it would be a hopeless dream for many people; its
5 Woods 1982: 167 is wrong to describe Aristotle’s argument here as ‘disappointingly dogmatic . . . it is
evident that the use of the term “chance” by the view he rejects is quite different from its use in the
Physics passage’. His account has been aptly criticised by K. Johnson 1997. A view closer to my own is
that of Bodéüs 2000: ‘clearly, the analysis of good fortune in the Eudemian Ethics conforms to
doctrines Aristotle’s natural philosophy developed elsewhere’ (167). Dudley 2012: 248–49 argues,
though in my view unpersuasively, that a developmental interpretation is required to account for
discrepancies between Physics 2.4–6 and EE 7.14.
6 Thus I call into question the more sanguine conclusions of Verbeke 1985: 254 and Buddensiek 2012.
7 Translations from the EE are adapted from Kenny 2011.
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acquisition would be beyond their powers no matter how strenuous their
endeavours. But if it is something in their own quality (ei d’en tôi auton poion
tina) and in accordance with their own activities, then it will be a good both
more widespread and divine. (EE 1.3.1215a12–17)
Aristotle recognises that morality has to exclude luck and nature as causes,
since they are not ‘up to us’, in order to deﬁne virtue and vice as appro-
priate objects of praise and blame.8 Accordingly, the scope of human
agency is restricted to exclude things caused by necessity, nature, and
luck.9 At the end of the EN, Aristotle repeats the point: of the causes of
becoming good, what is due to nature is not up to us but results from luck
(or divine oversight, which, it seems, amounts to the same thing):
Some think we become good by nature (phusei), some by habit (ethei), and
others by teaching (didachêi). Nature’s contribution is clearly not up to us
(ouk eph’hêmin), but it can be found in those who due to some divine cause
(dia tinas theias aitias) truly have good luck (eutuchesin). Argument and
teaching, presumably, are not powerful in every case, but the soul of the
student must be prepared beforehand in its habits with a view to its enjoying
and hating in a noble way, like soil that is to nourish seed.
(EN 10.9.1179b20–26)
Aristotle confronts luck as a cause of success in EE 7.14. Aristotle’s articu-
lation of the problem presupposes his earlier enumeration of the possible
causes of the good life:
Since not only intelligence (phronêsis) produces doing-well and virtue
(eupragian kai arêten), but we also say that the lucky (tous eutucheis) do
well (eu prattein), assuming that good luck produces doing-well well, and
the same things as knowledge (epistêmês), we must enquire whether or not it
8 ‘Since virtue and vice, and the works that are their expressions, are praised or blamed as the case
may be (for blame and praise are not given on account of things that come about by necessity or
luck or nature (ex anankês ê tuchês ê phuseôs) but on account of things that we ourselves are cause of;
since if someone else is cause of something, that is the one that gets the blame and praise), it is clear
that virtue and vice have to do with matters where the man himself is the responsible source of his
actions. We must then ascertain just what are the actions of which he is the cause and source’
(EE 2.7.1223a9–16).
9 Aristotle asserts that virtues arise either through teaching (in the case of the intellectual virtues) or as a
result of habituation, but ‘it is clear that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature’
(EN 2.1.1103a18–19). Nature, he argues, gives us the capacity to acquire them, but their perfection
comes about through habituation. This is also why Aristotle is concerned to distinguish ‘natural
virtue’ from intelligence and ‘virtue in the strict sense’ (EE 5 = EN 6.13.1144b1–16). ‘We deliberate
about what actions are up to us (peri tôn eph’ hêmin kai praktôn), what we can do; these things are
what remain to be done. For nature (phusis), necessity (anankê), and luck (tuchê) do seem to be
causes, but so too do sense or intellect and everything that occurs through human agency (nous kai
pan to di’ anthrôpou)’ (EN 3.3.1112a30–33).
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is by nature (phusei) that one man is lucky and another unlucky, and how
things stand concerning these things. (EE 7.14.1246b37–1247a3)
It is clear from this network of passages that Aristotle has in mind not
just limited prudential contexts, but even overall success or happiness. This
has been doubted: ‘I do not think that eupragia in this context [EE 7.14]
can mean anything like eudaimonia. Neither in the EN nor in the EE
would Aristotle have agreed that true happiness could come about by mere
luck’ (Kenny 1992: 57). But on my interpretation, this is exactly what is at
issue. It is possible for someone to end up happy and successful,
but without the causes that always or for the most part bring this about
(habituation, intelligence, and art). The fact that Aristotle in EE 7.14
mentions ‘doing well and virtue’ (eupragian kai aretên) is precisely what
makes the problem one of moral luck. If we were merely talking about
some people occasionally succeeding at some practical things (like making
money) without the use of intelligence (for example, by gambling), we
would not necessarily have a problem of moral luck. But to the extent that
we are talking about people ‘doing well’ in a strong sense, and even
attaining virtue by luck, we clearly have a more profound problem. The
problem of moral luck should thus not be seen as an afterthought
that Aristotle confronts only late in the EE. On the contrary, determining
the causal inﬂuence of luck on human success is a central concern of
Aristotle’s ethics as a whole and from the beginning.
As Aristotle points out in the Physics: ‘good luck (hê eutuchia) seems to
be the same or nearly the same as happiness’ (2.6.197b4). One reason for
this is that those who experience very bad luck are usually said to be
unhappy. In EN 1.9–11 Aristotle discusses how humans are exposed to
luck because they need external goods such as friends, wealth, and political
power over which they have at best incomplete control; lack of certain
goods, like high birth, noble children, and beauty, over which no one has
any control, can even ruin happiness. And although ‘a happy man will
never become miserable, nevertheless blessedness will not be his if he runs
into the luck of a Priam’ (1101a7–8). For such reasons, ‘because we need
luck as well as other things, some people think that good luck is the same
thing as happiness’ (1153b21–22), as Aristotle puts it, much more delicately
than Plato in the Euthydemus, where Socrates sarcastically comments that
‘we are in danger of leaving out the greatest good of all . . . good luck, which
everyone says is the greatest of the goods, even very despicable people’
(279c5–8). Notice, however, an ambiguity in the expression ‘good luck’.
When investigating the problem about the causes of the good life, luck is
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often treated as a cause, a kind of efﬁcient cause (or co-cause, a factor) of an
individual’s success. But in common parlance some people identify the
same efﬁcient cause with the end: having good luck is taken to be not just a
cause of doing well, but the goal itself. Aristotle, who was very conscious of
this distinction, only uses ‘good luck’ in the latter sense when he is
criticising the popular view of happiness and luck (EN 7.13.1153b21–25;
cf. 1.8.1099b10; EE 1.1.1214a25–26; Rhet. 1.5.1360b14–26). In his own ana-
lysis, as we will see, luck is treated as a potential cause of happiness, in
parallel to the way in which other things might be thought a cause of
happiness, such as nature, intelligence, or divine providence.
That the lucky do not succeed by intelligence (phronêsei) is clear,
Aristotle argues, from the fact that ‘intelligence is not irrational (alogos),
but has a reason because of which it acts; while those who are lucky are not
able to give a reason because of which they succeed, for that would be art
(technê)’ (1247a13–15). In the Euthydemus it was debated whether wise
artists (such as ﬂute players, writers, pilots, generals, and doctors) are
luckier than unwise ones, but the conclusion is reached that, insofar as
they have wisdom, artists ‘have no need of any good luck in addition’
(280b2–3). Aristotle in EE 7.14 uses one of the examples from the
Euthydemus in order to make the argument that art is not the cause of
luck: ‘in navigation, it is not the cleverest pilots who enjoy good luck, but it
is just as in dice, where one player throws nothing, but another throws a
six10 in accordance with his natural good luck (kath’ hên phusei estin eutuchês)’
(1247a21–23). The italicised expression is, given Aristotle’s distinctions,
paradoxical. It has just been argued that luck cannot be caused by art;
how then can luck be caused by nature?
It cannot be due to being favoured by a god or a divine overseer.
Although Aristotle in EE 1.1 raised the possibility ‘of being overseen
by some spirit’ (epipnoiai daimoniou tinos) as a possible cause of success,
Aristotle argues in EE 7.14 that it would be absurd if the lucky succeeded
‘because of something external and being loved, so to speak, by a god’
(tôi phileisthai, hôsper phasin, hupo theou), as a worse-built ship might
sail much better, not because of itself, but because it has an excellent
pilot (1247a23–29, using again the same example from the Euthydemus).
The same argument is made in Aristotle’s scientiﬁc investigation of
divination by dreams (Div. Somn. 1.1.462b18–22; cf. EN 10.8.1179a22–32;
10 It seems necessary to adopt Jackson’s supplement ‘hex’ at 1247a23: ‘as in the fall of the dice, one man
throws a blank and another a six’. Jackson’s supplement (1913: 182–83, adopted by Kenny 2011) is
supported by the Latin tradition.
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MM 2.8.1207a6–13). But if divine oversight cannot be the cause of their
luck, then the cause must be nature or intelligence: ‘if, then, success must
be due either to nature (phusei) or intellect (noôi) or some kind of over-
sight (epitropiai tini), and not to the latter two causes, then the lucky
must be so by nature’ (1247a29–31). But, again, how could someone be
lucky by nature?
To answer that, we turn to Aristotle’s account of nature in Physics 2.1: ‘a
principle or cause of being moved or being at rest in that to which it belongs
primarily, intrinsically (kath’auto), and not incidentally (kata sumbebêkos)’
(192b21–23).11 Two fundamental causal distinctions are at work here: ﬁrst,
between being an internal as opposed to external cause of motion or rest
(which differentiates nature from art); and second, between being an intrinsic
as opposed to incidental cause (which differentiates nature and art from
spontaneity and luck). Nature is an internal and intrinsic cause of ends (for
example, health); art is an external and intrinsic cause of the same natural
ends, speciﬁcally those that nature is incapable of bringing to completion
(such as the health produced by a doctor); and luck and spontaneity are
external and incidental causes of artistic or natural ends (for example, luck
can be the cause of health that would have been produced following the
doctor’s orders for heating by rubbing, but instead was caused by a change of
weather; spontaneity can be the cause of the generation and health of certain
plants and insects that do not reproduce sexually).
Thus, the ends of natural things determine the ends of everything else.
‘The nature is the end or that for the sake of which. For if a thing undergoes
a continuous change toward some end, this last stage is also that for the
sake of which’ (194a28–30). By ‘continuous’ Aristotle means ‘without
impediment’. Aristotle understands and explains such a process of contin-
uous natural generation by analogy to artistic production:
Where there is an end, all the preceding steps are for the sake of that. Now
surely as in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action,
should nothing impede it. Now action is for the sake of an end; therefore
the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g. had been a thing made
by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and
if things made by nature were made not only by nature but also by art,
they would come to be in the same way as if by nature. The one, then, is
for the sake of the other; and generally art in some cases completes what
nature cannot bring to a ﬁnish, and in others imitates nature. If, therefore,
artiﬁcial products are for sake of an end, so clearly also are the natural
11 Translations from Physics 2 are adapted from Hardie and Gaye 1984.
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products. The relation of the later to the earlier items is the same. (Physics
2.8.199a8–20)
The process of building goes through several stages (the laying of the
foundation, putting up the walls, sealing the roof, etc.), and all these
stages are undertaken for the sake of a deﬁnite end (i.e. shelter and
protection from weather and intruders). Now Aristotle not only argues
that natural things, like plants and animals, undergo an analogous
process for the sake of an end (e.g. developing from seedling, to sapling,
to ﬂourishing oak). But he goes further, holding that all artiﬁcial pro-
cesses – without exception, including the art of building – also come
about for the sake of natural ends. That art imitates nature or ﬁlls in
where it falls short is a key principle for Aristotle (Physics 2.2.194a21–22,
2.8.199a15–17;Mete. 4.3.381b6; PA 1.5.645a10–15;Metaph. 7.9.1034a33–34;
Pol. 7.17.1337a1–3; Protr. 9.49.28–50.1, 50.12, 10.54.22–23; cf. [Ar.] Mu.
396b11–12; Johnson 2005: 81, 148 and Johnson 2012: 120–24, 128–34).
Thus, shelter and protection of human beings are the natural ends for the
sake of which the art of building produces houses. In general nature itself
completes the process resulting in natural ends, but in several cases nature
cannot bring them to perfection, and so art must step up to do so. In this
conception, art, and in general all rational action, has no other end, and
can have no other end, than bringing about determinate and predeter-
mined natural ends.
Everyone agrees that art and nature are causes, but philosophers are not
agreed that luck is a cause, as Aristotle points out at the beginning of Physics
2.4: ‘some people even question whether it exists or not. They say that
nothing happens by luck, but that everything which we ascribe to luck or
spontaneity has some deﬁnite cause . . . it is always possible, they maintain,
to ﬁnd something which is the cause’ (195b36–196a6). As Simplicius points
out, the target of this criticism is Democritus, for he attempted to eliminate
luck altogether as a cause from both cosmology and ethics. He would
argue, for example, that the cause of the man ﬁnding the treasure while
digging was not good luck but rather his intention to plant an olive tree
(Simplicius in Physics 330.14–20; see also Johnson 2009: 32–36). Aristotle
also discusses the view of ‘others who believe that luck is a cause, but that it
is unclear to human intellect (adêlos de anthrôpinêi dianoiai), as being
something divine and more spiritual (hôs theion ti ousa kai
daimoniôteron)’ (196b5–7). Aristotle rejects both the eliminative position,
and the divine oversight explanation, in staking out two doctrines about
luck.
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First, luck is an incidental cause (hê tuchê aitia kata sumbebêkos) of things
in accordance with choice and for the sake of something (2.5.197a5–6).
Things that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as
a result of thought (apo dianoias) or of nature (apo phuseôs) (196b22). In the
wider case of things that normally come to be from nature, including some
plants, and beasts, the incidental cause is ‘spontaneity’ (hence ‘spontaneous
generation’). But luck pertains only to the subset of these things that are
usually the result of thought; thus luck exists among things ‘entirely
practical (holôs praxis)’ (2.6.197b2).
In Physics 2.3 the example of incidental causation is Polyclitus: insofar
as he is a sculptor, he is the intrinsic cause of the statue Doryphorus, but
insofar as he is a musical man, the musical man (ho mousikos) is an
incidental cause of the same statue (2.3.195a32–b3). In 2.5 Aristotle
repeats the example, but this time instead of a musical sculptor he talks
about a musical builder: an architect is intrinsically the cause of a house,
but the ‘musical’ man is the incidental cause of a house if the architect
happens to be musical. In 2.4 (196a3–5) the example is of a man who goes
to the agora and happens to run into someone who owes him money;
although we say that it was by luck that creditor met debtor, can we say
(as a Democritean might) that it is due to the creditor’s goal of collecting
subscriptions for a feast and the debtor’s goal of going shopping?
Aristotle’s answer is that it can, but incidentally and not intrinsically.
Aristotle concludes: ‘it is clear then that luck is an incidental cause in the
class of those actions that are for the sake of something which involve
choice’ (2.5.197a5–6, 32–35).
Although they occur in the class of things that happen for the sake of
something, spontaneity and luck are in fact just natural and intelligent
moving causes, which produce incidental results that happen to be experi-
enced by intelligent agents as good or bad luck. For example, the collection
of the debt was due to an intelligent cause, the intention to solicit
subscriptions, but this was incidentally the cause of collecting the debt; in
this way luck was a cause. Aristotle summarises:
We have now explained what luck is and what spontaneity is, and in what
way they differ from each other. Both belong to the mode of causation
‘source of change’. For either some natural or intelligent agent is always
the cause (ê gar tôn phusei ti ê tôn apo dianoias aition aei estin). But in this
kind of causation the number of possible causes is inﬁnite. Spontaneity
and luck are causes of effects that, though they might result from intelli-
gence or nature, have in fact been caused by something incidentally.
(2.6.198a1–7)
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That luck is an incidental cause is the ﬁrst major doctrine of Aristotle’s
account in Physics 2. The second is that luck is not a cause of things that
occur in the same way either always or for the most part (2.5.196b10–17).
Luck is thereby opposed not only to necessity but also to regularity. Luck is
said to be indeﬁnite and irrational, and not susceptible to a scientiﬁc
explanation. ‘Luck is something irrational’ (ti paralogon tên tuchên)
(197a18). The results of luck are indeﬁnite or ‘unlimited’, and can be either
good or bad. That is why it is considered a mysterious thing, a cause
inscrutable to human wisdom. For the creditor, for example, the recovery
of the debt was good luck; for the debtor, on the other hand, running into
the creditor was bad luck. Good luck is therefore unstable: ‘with good reason
good luck is regarded as unreliable; for luck is unreliable; for none of the
things which result from luck can be always or for themost part’ (197a30–32).
Are these views consistent with the account of luck and nature in EE
7.14? Does Aristotle contradict himself by arguing in the Physics that the
results of luck do not happen always or for the most part, and are unreli-
able, but in the Eudemian Ethics that some people actually become success-
ful due to luck? I will argue that Aristotle’s position is consistent, because
he holds that those who are continuously successful succeed not because of
luck but because of nature (and so an intrinsic, not incidental cause); those,
on the other hand, whose success is due to luck not nature are not
continuously successful, but just as often experience bad luck.
Aristotle walks a parallel dialectical path in Eudemian Ethics 7.14 as he
did in Physics 2.4–6 by considering (and subsequently rejecting) both the
eliminative and the divine oversight explanations of luck, and also by
attempting to reduce the causes of good luck to nature:
If, then, success must be due either to nature or intelligence or some kind of
oversight, and the latter two causes are out of the question, then the lucky
must be so by nature. But, on the other hand, nature is the cause of what is
always or for the most part so, luck the opposite. If, then, it is thought that
irrational success (to paralogôs epitugchanein) is due to luck, but that (if it is
through luck that one is lucky) the cause of his luck is not the kind of cause
that produces the same result always or for the most part – further, if a
person succeeds or fails because he is a certain kind of man, just as a man sees
badly because he is blue-eyed, then it follows that not luck but nature is the
cause. He then has not good luck but something like a good nature (ouk ara
estin eutuchês all’ hoion euphuês). (1247a29–38)
Aristotle wants to establish whether the lucky succeed out of some habit or
condition (apo tinos hexeôs), or instead not because of any quality of their
own (ou tôi autoi poioi tines) (1247a3–8). He connects this issue with the
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more general problem (raised in the same terms in EE 1.3) of which causes
of happiness are up to us, and due to our own internal and intrinsic
qualities, as opposed to external or incidental inﬂuences. The proposal in
the Eudemian Ethics is to reduce all cases of continuous good or bad luck to
natural causes, just as in theory all cases of good or bad vision are reducible
to natural causes. Aristotle earlier in the chapter compared people who are
lucky to those who have certain qualities that distinguish them ‘immedi-
ately from birth, just as some are blue-eyed and some black-eyed, because
of the necessity for one to have some particular colour (tôi to dein toiondi
echein); so too it is necessary that some are lucky and others unlucky’
(1247a9–12). This corresponds to the examples he gave in EE 1.1 of people
who become happy ‘as we become tall people or short people, or differently
coloured people’ (1214a17–18).
InGeneration of Animals 5.1, Aristotle presents a scientiﬁc account of ‘the
affections by which the parts of animals differ, I mean such affections of the
parts as blueness and blackness of eyes’ (778a16–18): some of these ‘turn
out’ (tugchanei) similarly for whole kinds of animals, while others happen
‘as if by luck’ (hopôs etuchen), the latter including especially those that
‘incidentally occur’ (sumbebêken) to humans (a20–22). Animals generally
have one eye colour only (e.g. cattle are dark-eyed, goats are yellow-eyed,
unnamed other animals are blue- or grey-eyed), but humans (along with
horses) happen to have several eye colours (blue, grey, black, and yellow).
The eyes of humans at birth are bluish, but later they change to the colour
that they then have permanently. The reason that infant eyes are initially
blue and not any other colour is that ‘the parts are weaker in the newly born
and blueness is a sort of weakness’ (779b10–12). Eyes are composed of
water, and those with more liquid are darker or blacker, while those with
less are bluer; the other colours are intermediate between these (779b12–
34). Black eyes and blue eyes are thus understood in terms of excess and
deﬁciency of liquid, and correspondingly people with these colours have
eye problems (black-eyed people have difﬁculty with night vision, blue-
eyed people with day vision); those with a more intermediate eye colour
have better vision (779b34–780a25). Before going on to give his account of
good and bad eyesight, Aristotle summarises why humans and horses
sometimes have eyes of two different colours (780b2–12): just as humans
turn grey in old age, and horses whiten with age, due to weakness of ﬂuid in
the brain and lack of concoction, so blueness or blackness of the eyes is
caused by excess or deﬁciency of liquid concoction in the eyes.
If we apply this physical account to the analogy between lucky or
unlucky people and the blue- or black–eyed people of the Eudemian
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Ethics, the following is the result. Eye colour, although it is not produced
for the sake of an end (as eyes themselves are), ends up, incidentally, in
the class of things that are for the sake of an end, since eye colour affects
whether one has good or bad vision.12 Eye colour is not random, but
rather is the result of matter affecting and being affected in certain ways:
liquid being concocted or not, drying out, etc. That is, it is a matter of
nature and necessity, and of what is always or for the most part the same.
It is for this reason possible to give a scientiﬁc account of eye colour.
Thus, the so-called ‘lucky’ people of the Eudemian Ethics, if they are
relevantly like the blue- and black-eyed people of the Generation of
Animals, are not those who on this or that occasion happen to suffer
some good or evil, but rather those who, because of some natural and in
principle scientiﬁcally determinate cause, continually enjoy some good or
suffer some evil.
Once Aristotle has reduced this continual kind of good luck to nature in
EE 7.14, he asks whether it is possible to eliminate luck entirely: ‘but if this
is so, are we to say that luck exists at all, or not?’ (1247b1–2); ‘whether it is to
be wholly eliminated and we are to say that nothing is produced by luck,
although we continue to say that it is a cause, because when we do not see a
cause we say it is luck, which is why in deﬁning luck some put it down as a
cause inscrutable to human reasoning (analogon anthrôpinôi logismôi),
though still being something natural’ (1247b4–8).
The conclusion that the continuously ‘lucky’ succeed not by luck but by
nature raises the possibility that luck might be eliminated entirely. But
insofar as there remain some cases in which we cannot ﬁnd a natural or
intelligent cause, luck remains a cause: ‘but it is necessary both for luck to
exist and to be a cause. It is, then, a cause of goods or evils to certain people’
(1247b2–4). Notice that this residual kind of luck produces not only good,
but also evil, as Aristotle reminds us later: ‘But since we see some getting
lucky once, why should they not be so again, because they succeed and
then do it again? For the cause is the same. Thus this is not a matter of
luck . . . when the same thing incidentally happens, from unlimited and
indeﬁnite things (apobainêi apeirôn kai aoristôn), it may be good or evil’
(1247b9–13).
12 Woods’ (1982: 165) comment on the EE passage that ‘it is a gift of nature, some people being born
lucky, just as some are born blue-eyed’ ignores the fact that according to Aristotle all humans are
born blue-eyed (most later undergoing a change in eye colour) and that blue-eyed people are not
lucky but unlucky insofar as they have bad vision. Dudley 2012: 238 also seems to assume that those
born blue-eyed are ‘fortunate by nature’.
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In Physics 2, the fact that luck causes goods or evils was part of the
explanation of why luck is irrational or inscrutable to human reason. And
in EE 7.14 Aristotle repeats the point:
But there will not be a science of luck that comes from experience, since then
some would have learned to become lucky, or even all the sciences would
be cases of good luck as Socrates said . . . What then prevents many such
things happening to someone in succession, not because they should in this
way, but as, for example, the dice might continually throw high numbers?
(1247b13–18)
Aristotle asks whether one could be continuously successful without intel-
ligence or nature being a cause, but like the lucky dicer who continually
rolls sixes. How is the comparison to be interpreted? Most commentators
seem to assume that Aristotle has gambling in mind, and just as in a hand
of Craps one may throw double sixes several times in a row, so in life one
might just run into a streak of good luck, perhaps discovering gold while
planting olives, and then running into an overdue and difﬁcult to locate
debtor on a routine trip to collect subscriptions for a feast. According to a
fragment of Sophocles, ‘the dice of Zeus fall ever luckily’ (fragment 809,
attributed to Phaedra). This is impressive presumably because it is impos-
sible for a human player at dice to continually roll well. Surely any run of
good luck must eventually give way to a run of (equally) bad luck.
Otherwise dicing would be a science. Possibly what Aristotle has in mind
is not gambling but divination, which Aristotle is prepared to consider a
science.13 Ancient Greeks certainly used dice as divinatory instruments. If
anyone were continually to roll sixes on divinatory dice, an Aristotelian
might say that this ‘natural good luck’ is caused not by luck but by the
person’s nature. But all this is doubtful and, whatever Aristotle thinks
about the ‘science of divination’, his rejection of any ‘science of luck’ is due
to the impossibility of an object that is both caused by luck and has results
that are always or for the most part the same (e.g. good or evil). Such results
are exactly the objects of science, and that is why the sciences would turn
out to be ‘cases of good luck’ if luck could be the cause of good or bad
things continuously. But since there is no science of luck, and the sciences
deal with intrinsic not incidental causes, we have to consider the causes of
luck real but incidental, indeﬁnite and unlimited, and hence unclear or
13 In the Parva Naturalia, Aristotle allows that ‘there might actually be a science of expectation, like
that of divination’ (449b11–12). Aristotle does not seem excessively sceptical about divination even in
relatively negative statements, e.g. Cael. 285a3–4; Rhet. 1407b2. Aristotle does not mention dice as
divinatory instruments, but on their use in antiquity, see S. I. Johnson 2008.
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irrational to human reason. As such we cannot integrate them into an art
by means of which we might cause ourselves to become happy. And so
Aristotle rejects the idea that continually successful people can be so by
luck. But since we have determined above that there are people who
continuously succeed not through any kind of learning or discipline, we
are forced back to the conclusion that the lucky succeed by nature.
Aristotle thus proceeds to develop and defend that idea by searching for
a natural cause that would allow the good normally achieved by intelli-
gence to be generated by nature alone:
Are there not desires in the soul, some from reason, but others from
irrational drives (apo orexeôs alogou) and which are prior? For if the drive
arising from desire for pleasure exists by nature, then by nature everything
would march to the good (phusei ge epi to agathon badizoi an pan).
(1247b18–21)
Aristotle sketches a causal account of how the so-called ‘lucky’ actually
succeed by nature. Although they do not use reasoning, since their desires
are naturally good (i.e. moderate), they succeed simply by following their
desires.What they experience as pleasurable is good by nature. The striking
conclusion ‘by nature everything would march to the good’ in the
Eudemian Ethics directly follows from the doctrine of the Physics according
to which nature continually reaches its end (its good) if nothing impedes it
(199a8–20; 199b25–26).14 In EE 2.8 Aristotle presupposes this doctrine in
the context of the ‘natural’ sources of action:
One of our natural sources of action is reason, which will be present when
development proceeds without being stunted (mê pêrôtheisês); and another is
appetite, which is an attribute present from the moment of birth. Roughly
speaking, these are the twomarks by which we deﬁne what is natural to us: it
is either an attribute of everyone at birth, or something that comes to us if
development proceeds normally, such as grey hair and old age and the like.
(1224b29–35)
It is very signiﬁcant for Aristotle that in the natural order of generation
appetite precedes reason, because if the lucky succeed due not to reason but
to something more primitive in our nature, then it will be clearer why the
‘lucky’ should be thought to succeed by nature. The so-called lucky
14 InMetaph. 6.3, Aristotle argues that were it not for incidental causes, all things would be necessary. I
agree with D. Frede’s interpretation of this according to which Aristotle is not subscribing to a
‘mechanistic’ or ‘Democritean’ style determinism, but rather a ‘teleological determinism’: ‘If there
were no interference by accidental causes the telos would always come about, in nature as well as in
human actions. But for such interference everything would always reach its proper end and could be
predicted with certainty’ (Frede 1985: 220; cf. 1992: 203).
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succeed, then, simply because they follow their innate or congenital
pleasures, which are aimed at naturally good desires, and nothing impedes
them, and so they continually achieve the same goods that others achieve
by intelligence and art. The lucky, then, are deﬁned as those who succeed
because of their natural drives even though their ability to reason is under-
developed or not applied. But then those we call ‘the lucky’ are not actually
lucky at all – they in fact exemplify the continual process of the natural
order, achieving natural ends by natural means:
If, then, some have a good nature (like those who are musical15 without
knowing how to sing), and they are driven, without using reason, their
nature growing naturally (hê phusis pephuke), and they desire that which
they should, and at the time and in the way that they should, then these
people will succeed, even though they happen to be unintelligent and
irrational (just as those others sing well while not able to teach singing).
And this kind of people will be ‘lucky’: those who, without using reason,
succeed for the most part (hosoi aneu logou katorthousin hôs epi to polu).
Therefore the people who are lucky will be so by nature. (1247b21–28)
Aristotle presents the fact that some people succeed without using reason as
unobjectionable, since it is a case of nature continually marching towards its
ends with nothing impeding it. Bad luck should accordingly be understood
as incidental impediments to natural ends that would otherwise continually
come about. For those humans who are not ‘the lucky’ (i.e. most people),
nature is not capable on its own of bringing out these natural ends con-
tinually, and so habituation and learning are hypothetically necessary for
them to become happy. The example of ‘musical’ people, which we saw
repeatedly used in Physics 2 as well, bears this out. Elsewhere Aristotle
describes as ‘musical’ (oidikoi) both a man who likes music and one who is
able to perform (1238a36–37). But ‘knowing how to sing’ means knowing
how to sing well, as becomes clear when Aristotle says ‘those others sing well
while not being able to teach singing’. Being able to teach is an indication of
knowledge, but some can evidently sing well without ‘knowing how to sing’
(in the sense of being able to teach singing). Without using reason they
succeed at some good, as does a child who has a natural talent for music. The
ability to sing, or at least to be musical even without being able to teach
music, must then be something natural for humans, something they would
continuously achieve if only nothing interferes.16 Thus, in praising a
15 Reading ᾠδικοί for ἄδικοι at 1247b22 following Sylburg (as reported in Jackson 1913: 189).
16 Aristotle does hold that music is natural for humans. For example, in HA 1.1 he says that, among
animals that have voice, ‘some are musical and some unmusical’ (488a34). In Poetics 1 the voice is
treated along with other components of music (including rhythm, language, and harmony) in the
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naturally talented singer (as opposed to one who has become good by art), we
are really praising nature, not luck. Although we do not all become excellent
singers by nature, nevertheless we can all become good singers, and if we do
not the cause of that deﬁciency should be understood as a kind of impedi-
ment to the development of a natural capability. Accordingly, arts like
singing lessons and musical education are necessary to compensate for
where nature falls short.
The argument of 1247b18–28, then, returns to the possibility of elim-
inating all luck. The phenomenon of certain people being continually
lucky is to be explained by means of their natural drives and thus natural
causes. It would for these people be more accurate to say they have a ‘good
nature’ than to say that they have ‘good luck’. But Aristotle does not think
that this reduction eliminates all luck, because there remains another kind
of person to whom the term lucky is applied:
Or is the term ‘lucky’ said inmany ways? For some are actions from the drive
(prattetai apo tês hormês) and deliberate acts (proelomenôn praxai), but others
are not, but the opposite. And when those people who seem to reason badly
succeed, we say they too are ‘lucky’, but also those people who wish for less
good than they get. (1247b28–33)
We apply the term ‘lucky’ both (1) to people who undertake actions ‘from
the drive and by choice’ in accordance with natural ends, and who succeed
despite faulty reasoning; and (2) people who undertake actions not neces-
sarily in accordance with their natural ends, and yet who succeed more
than can be reasonably expected. The former, as we have seen, may be
lucky by nature. For, since their drives and choices are for things good by
nature, they succeed, even though ‘their reasoning was laughable’
(1247b35). In these cases, they are ‘saved’ (1247b37) by having naturally
good drives, and the fact that nothing has impeded the natural course of
development. The second group of people can be lucky on occasion, but
not continually, since their luck is not natural, and they cannot fall back on
their natural drives to steer them in the right direction. Aristotle thus holds
that if someone else without the right kind of drives reasons as the lucky do,
they will probably fail and be considered unlucky (1247b37–38). When
such people are lucky they have succeeded ‘contrary to all knowledge and
right reasoning’ (para pasas tas epistêmas kai tous logismous tous orthous) and
not even in accordance with natural drives; such people alone succeed by
luck (1247b38–1248a5).
context of mimetic art (1447a14–24), which is considered natural for humans: ‘imitation being
natural to us as also the sense of harmony and rhythm’ (1448b20–21).
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We can now summarise how this possibility relates to the Physics
account. One can have unexpected success as a result of incidental causes,
but one may not do so continuously. The actual causes will be natural and
intelligent causes aimed at other ends, just as the cause of collecting the
debt was the intention to collect subscriptions, though incidentally. But if
one enjoys continuous success not due to intelligence then although we call
these people ‘lucky’ the cause of their success must not be luck but nature:
they exemplify what happens when human goodness unfolds without
anything impeding it and without any need of intelligence to ﬁll in
where nature falls short, since in this case it does not fall short. Thus, all
luck does end up being reducible to nature or intelligent causes: continual
good luck to having been born with a ‘good nature’; unexpected good luck
to having beneﬁted incidentally from causes intrinsically aimed at some
other good (whether natural or artistic). Aristotle usefully summarises the
negative results of his investigation: ‘the result is that the argument does
not show that to be lucky is due to nature (because not all those people who
seem to be lucky succeed because of luck, but rather because of nature); nor
does the argument show that luck is the cause of nothing, but only that it is
not the cause of everything it seems to be the cause of’ (1248a12–15).
Aristotle’s treatment of moral luck in the Eudemian Ethics is therefore
consistent with his treatment of luck in the Physics, not only walking a
parallel dialectical path, but also arriving at a compatible outlook. The
difﬁculty as I see it is not in the consistency of Aristotle’s account of luck,
but with the moral implications of his physical account of luck: if all luck is
reducible to the incidental effects of natural causes, then the real effects of
moral luck will also be due either to intrinsic or incidental natural causes;
but either way there is no room for doubt that they are real effects. Instead
of resolving the problem of moral luck, does not Aristotle thereby commit
himself to recognising the reality of constitutive moral luck?
In the conclusion of this chapter I argue that he does. We already saw
that Aristotle compares the lucky to people who are by nature taller, or of
different eye or skin colour. It must be acknowledged, I think, that
Aristotle is talking here not only about sex and age differences, but racial
ones as well. Aristotle understands both one’s drives and the capability to
deliberate and reason to come about by nature, as he points out in the
Politics: ‘almost all things rule and are ruled by nature (phusei) . . . although
the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in different
degrees: for the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it
is without authority, and the child has, but it is imperfect’ (1.13.1260a8–14).
Aristotle also thinks that the European races are characteristically brave and
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spirited but lacking in intellect and art (dianoias de endeestera kai technês)
(7.7.1327b24–25); Asians on the other hand are said to be more intelligent
and inventive but wanting in spirit and slavish; the Greeks, of course,
occupy the virtuous and happy middle place, being at once both high-
spirited and intelligent. There are related racial or ethnic differences among
the different Greek tribes: ‘for some of them have a one-sided nature (tên
phusin monokôlon), and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others
there is a combination of both these abilities’ (1327b34–36). Thus being
male or female, Asian, European, or Greek, or of a certain Greek tribe are
all understood as natural causes of both having certain drives and the
ability to reason, resulting in different natural inclinations to moral and
intellectual virtue and vice.
Consider, further, Aristotle’s distinction in the Politics between slavery
‘by nature’ or ‘by convention’. If people were rightly considered slaves who
are not born slaves by nature then the absurd consequence would follow
that ‘the most well-born men would incidentally happen (sumbêsetai) to be
slaves and born from slaves if it happened (sumbêi) that they or their
parents were sold in captivity’ (1255a26–28). The treatment of this thesis
as absurd shows Aristotle’s concern to avoid the conclusion that certain
races (i.e. peoples with certain ancestries)17 can by bad luck rightly be
considered slaves: ‘some are slaves everywhere, some nowhere’ (1255a31–32).
Clearly those that are slaves ‘everywhere’ are not so by luck or mere
convention. Since slaves reproduce slaves by nature (andmasters reproduce
masters), natural slavery is a matter of race and ancestry, and race is a
matter of nature, not convention or luck.
In the defence of natural slavery in Politics, Aristotle follows a parallel
dialectical path as in the Eudemian account of moral luck. Moral luck
being objectionable (since it implies unjustiﬁed and irrational success),
Aristotle tries to reduce it to natural causes, hoping to show it is thereby
unobjectionable (the other cases of unexpected success being irrelevant
because they are incidental, not continuous, and just as often turn out
bad). Similarly, slavery by convention or luck is obviously objectionable
(since it implies unjustiﬁed and irrational deprivation of freedom), but
Aristotle tries to show that there is a form of slavery that is unobjectionable
because it is natural, that is, due to natural racial differences.
The problem remains, however, that it is a matter of constitutive moral
luck whether I am born, for example, a Greek or a Barbarian (as Thales or
Socrates said, according to a report from Diogenes Laertius), and thus
17 Aristotle deﬁnes ‘race’ (genos) in Metaph. 5.28.
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either a master or a slave (‘by nature’); the same kind of thing, mutatis
mutandis, probably goes for being born a woman, and possibly goes even
for my having been born a human and not a brute animal, but certainly
goes for me being born into one or another Greek tribe.18 Arguing that the
cause of these things is natural does not show that they are not real or not a
problem; on the contrary, it shows that they are real and part of Aristotle’s
concept of nature.
Such a difﬁculty confronts Aristotle when in the Eudemian Ethics,
immediately after concluding that most natural luck is reducible to natural
causes (namely the right drives and desires), he presses on to ask what the
cause of having the right drives and desires might be. ‘This, however, one
might be perplexed about: is luck a cause of this very thing, the desiring of
what one should, and when one should? Or will it then be cause of
everything, even thought and deliberation?’ (1248a15–18). If all natural
drives and desires are caused by luck, then the attempt to reduce moral
luck by referring it to natural causes would fail; in effect those natural
causes would themselves become matters of moral luck. But the reduction
of what seems like luck to natural causes in the Physics, Ethics, and Politics
raises the problem that nature and the cosmic order will then be the cause
of what, for all human intents and purposes, is experienced as moral luck.
This does not allow us to avoid the phenomenon of moral luck; on the
contrary, it forces us to acknowledge it.
Aristotle does see and acknowledge this problem of natural causes
producing constitutive moral luck. This is clear not only from the chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics we are examining, but also from a passage in
Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, in which Aristotle describes the difﬁculties that
follow if one’s capability to interpret appearances correctly and so to aim at
the right ends are understood to be due to nature:
His aiming at the end is not up to him, but he must be born with a kind of
vision (alla phunai dei hôsper opsin echonta), to enable him to judge nobly
and to choose what is truly good. And a person has a good nature (euphuês) if
he has this nature nobly (touto kalôs pephuken), since it is the greatest and
noblest thing, and one cannot acquire or learn it from another; but as if it
grew (all’ hoion ephu) he has this, and when it is naturally good and noble,
this will be the complete and true good nature (hê teleia kai alêthinê an eiê
euphuia). If this is true, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? For
how the end appears and is determined – by nature or whatever – is the same
18 For an interesting discussion of the difference between the cases of becoming a woman and
becoming a slave, see Williams 1993: ch. 5.
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for both the good and the bad person, and it is by referring everything else to
this that they do whatever they do. (1114b5–16)19
According to this line of argument it makes little or no moral difference
whether having naturally good drives and capacities comes about due to
nature or luck. Either way, they will not be in the control of the agent, and
so the fundamental problem of moral luck, that some moral goods (and
evils) are not under our control, remains. And so Aristotle cannot avoid the
moral luck problem (as he himself has framed it) by reducing it to natural
causes. Even if it is by nature that certain people have a certain kind of
intellectual vision (which is what Aristotle means by opsin echonta in the
above passage), it will be a matter of luck for me whether I have a good
nature such that I am able to ‘see’ the right thing to do. It is just as in the
case of having blue or black eyes: the cause may be necessary and natural,
but the result that I am unable to see as well as someone with another
colour of eyes is, for me at least, unlucky. The problem becomes much
worse when you realise that the ability to reason and think in order to
overcome natural deﬁciencies (by means of the arts, sciences, etc.) might
itself be due to luck:
For one does not deliberate after having deliberated, and deliberated about
this, but there is a starting point; nor does one think by thinking before
thinking, and this goes on to inﬁnity. Therefore the starting point of
thought is not thinking, nor is the starting point of deliberation deliberat-
ing. What else could it be, then, except luck? (1248a18–22)
Barring an inﬁnite regress (thinking only after thinking about thinking;
deliberating only after deliberating about deliberating, etc.) thought and
deliberation must have a starting point. Aristotle now wonders what that
starting point could possibly be, other than luck. Thus those who manage
to deliberate around natural deﬁciencies so as to gain the same goods as ‘the
lucky’ (who enjoy the highest goods without intelligence), would be able to
do so only because of luck. But if this is the case, and all natural drives and
even the capability to reason come about by luck, then ‘everything will be a
result of luck’ (apo tuchês hapanta estai) (1248a22). In that case the con-
troversial view attributed to Theophrastus would be true: ‘Luck rules life,
not wisdom’ (apud Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 5.ix.25).
Aristotle’s ﬁnal attempt to avoid such a conclusion in EE 7.14 conﬁrms
that he has his physical and cosmological theory in mind as he struggles
with the problem of moral luck:
19 Translation adapted from Crisp 2000.
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Perhaps there is a starting point with none other outside it. And this is able
to act as a result of being the very kind of thing it is. And the object of our
search is this: what is the starting point of motion in the soul? Now it is clear
that as in the universe it is god, so too it is here. For ‘the divine in us moves
everything’. The starting point of reason is not a reason but something
stronger. So what could be said stronger even than knowledge, except god?
For ‘excellence is an instrument of the intellect’. (1248a22–29)
Aristotle deploys opinions of the wise (or proverbs) as warrants for an
argument that rapidly reaches the conclusion that god is the primary cause
of all change. Aristotle proves that god exists as the unmoved mover of all
natural change in Physics 7–8 and Metaphysics 12. The relevance of this
doctrine to EE 7.14 is that this ﬁnal cause of motion is prior to all luck, and
all luck is deﬁned as an incidental cause of what the unmoved mover (and
those motivated by it) cause intrinsically. The unmoved mover operates as
a ﬁnal cause not only of all deliberation and thought, but also of all natural
appetites and desires (in this way it is ‘the starting point of motion in the
soul’). Aristotle, strikingly, goes so far as to say that for those who have
naturally good appetites ‘deliberation is of no advantage to them, for they
have in them a principle that is better than intellect and deliberation’
(1248a31–32). These are the lucky people who, without reason, achieve a
kind of success through divine inspiration, that is, they do well because of
the god (tôi theôi, 1248a38). Now this expression must refer to the ﬁnal
causality of the unmoved mover, and not any efﬁcient causality of any
other kind of god, because Aristotle has ﬂatly rejected the idea that anyone
should succeed without the use of intelligence ‘because of being loved, so to
speak, by a god’ (tôi phileisthai, hôsper phasin, hupo theou) at 1247a23–24.20
But divine inspiration allows certain lucky people to succeed without using
intelligence and intellect, but instead by following more primitive drives.21
Interpreted in this way as a reference to the inﬂuence of the unmoved
mover on primitive natural desires, EE 7.14 remains consistent not only
20 The apparent tension between these positions is the subject of a useful study by van der Eijk 1989. A
related point is made in EN 10.8: the wise must be the most beloved of the gods (theophilestatos,
1179a30). See also Bodéüs 2000: 163 and Dudley 2012.
21 According toWhiting 1996: 181–85, Aristotle’s solution to the problem of constitutive moral luck has
to do with ‘nous [intellect] identiﬁcation’. While I agree with the thrust of this interpretation and
ﬁnd it an attractive solution, it is not sufﬁcient either as an interpretation of EE 7 or as a solution to
the problem of constitutive moral luck for the following reason. In EE 7.14, Aristotle is discussing
people for whom ‘deliberation is of no advantage to them, for they have in them a principle that is
better than nous and deliberation’ (1248a31–32). Since such people beneﬁt from moral luck, others
must suffer by the same token, that is, from being so naturally constituted as neither to have good
natural desires, nor being capable of ‘increasing their nous’ so as to overcome their natural
deﬁciencies.
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with itself (and with Aristotle’s principle barring divine favouritism), but
also his overall doctrine of the Physics. In his summary (1248b3–7), Aristotle
also calls this kind of luck ‘divine’ (theia, 1248b3) and suggests that it is
‘through god’ (dia theon, 1248b4).
Naturally lucky, then, are those ‘divinely’ blessed with good appetites
and who succeed without intelligence or deliberation, but in accordance
with nature. It is perhaps surprising that Aristotle admits a class of people
who do better without reasoning but by following their natural desires
(1248a29–b3). He compares them to blind people compensating for their
deﬁciency by developing better memory than the sighted, bringing to
mind the several other cases throughout his investigation in which he has
compared those who are capable of using reason to succeed with those who
have good vision.
Less lucky, of course, are those who require intelligence and deliberation
to succeed, and who suffer from appetites not properly aligned to the
unmoved mover. But such people can overcome moral luck by identifying
more with their intellect and using reason to modify their natural drives
and external circumstances. Positively unlucky, however, are those who use
intelligence and deliberation but still fail due to circumstances beyond
their control.
Unluckiest of all are those who for natural reasons such as their sex or
race are not able to reason and deliberate properly in the ﬁrst place. What
difference does it make whether we consider their situation a matter of
nature instead of luck? Whether success turns out to be something that
‘comes to be due to luck (dia tuchên) or due to nature (dia phusin) it would
be a hopeless dream for many people; its acquisition would be beyond their
powers no matter how strenuous their endeavours’ (EE 1.3.1215a12–15).
Aristotle’s realisation that nature and luck are morally equivalent as causes
of human happiness shows why he might appeal to his account of the
principle of nature at the end of the Eudemian Ethics in looking for a
solution to the problem of moral luck. But the fact that the unmoved
mover turns out to be the ﬁnal cause of moral luck does not resolve the
problem, even while it puts the blame on a cosmological or theological
principle.
Thus Aristotle discovered troubling implications of the problemwe now
know as constitutive moral luck. The chief value of his account stems from
its being the original formulation of the problem (and a problem that
remains at the heart of contemporary moral theory), and Aristotle’s
exemplary forthrightness in confronting the moral implications of his
own natural science.
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